INDIA’S JOURNEY FROM FAMINE 1975 TO GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS 2022
A perfect storm of weather, Ukraine-Russia war, Covid-19, and export controls has culminated in global food crisis. United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization’s food price index was at 145.2 in August after hitting a record 159.7 in March 2022 (April 2020: 92.5). As per UN World Food Programme estimates, 49 million people are at immediate risk of starvation, and another 323 million are marching towards starvation. The number of food insecure people has increased to 1.6 billion from 1.2 billion in December 2021. Sixty food deficit countries do not have foreign exchange to import food. In this context it is pertinent to revisit how India became a food surplus country.
Famine predicted in 1975
With population growth outstripping food production, Paddock brothers predicted widespread famine in India and several underdeveloped countries (the term developing countries was not in vogue) by 1975. Their 1967 best-seller “Famine 1975: America’s decision who will survive” postulated that wheat surplus USA was the only hope for the hungry nations. They categorised food-deficit countries into three groups: (i) those which can be saved with US help, (ii) the “walking wounded” who will stagger through, and (iii) those which cannot be saved due to overpopulation, primitive agriculture, and political incompetence. India headed the third group. Providing wheat aid to India, was like throwing sand in the ocean, they argued.
Green Revolution
Taking a contrarian view, William S. Gaud, Administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), coined the term Green Revolution in March 1968 to dramatize his belief that cultivation of new high yielding wheat and rice seeds could help India and other countries feed themselves. As USAID Head for Asia from 1961 to 1964, he had observed developments in Indian agriculture. Building on the support provided by USAID, Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation, the Government of India implemented bold policies, producing early shoots of food security by 1968. Gaud’s Green Revolution prediction was based on his prescient observations.
The road map was outlined in “Report on India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet it” prepared by the Indo-American Agriculture Production Team in 1959. Despite myriad of formidable challenges, trilogy of revamped agriculture technology system, farmer services and enabling policies was operational by 1965. The key components were establishment of State Agricultural Universities, Agricultural Prices Commission, Food Corporation of India (FCI) and Agriculture Produce Market Committees, and expansion of Indian Council of Agricultural Research and the State Departments of Agriculture.
From 1950–51 to 1965–66 average wheat and rice yield increased by 27%, but population jumped by a whopping 36%. Nobel Laureate Norman Borlaug of International Wheat and Maize Research Centre in Mexico visited India in 1963 and supplied 100 kg seed of four wheats which yielded 30% higher than the local varieties. Chief Ministers’ Conference in April 1966 decided to import 18,000 metric tonne seed of Mexican wheats Lerma Rojo and Sonora 64.
Under High Yielding Varieties Programme launched in 1966, similar support was provided to all states, but immediate success was achieved in Punjab due to excellent implementation, consolidation of land holdings and the enterprising Punjab farmers. The imported seed was distributed to large number of farmers in 2, 4 and 10 kg cloth bags stitched in the jails. As Punjab was readying for sowing, a force majeure struck at the eleventh hour. Haryana was carved out on 1st November 1966, disrupting administrative machinery. On the strength of comprehensive action plan, Punjab’s fertilizer allocation was enhanced from 6 to 15 lakh acres. Passenger trains were stopped, prioritising 32 fertilizer rakes on Kandla-Bathinda line. Bulk of imported fertilizer was available to farmers within three days of unloading at Bathinda.
Introduction of remunerative Minimum Support Price (MSP) for wheat in 1967 was supplemented by assured procurement by FCI. Farmers were incentivised to produce more wheat by raising the MSP from Rs 64 per quintal in 1966–67 to Rs 76 in 1968–69. Wheat yield and production in Punjab jumped by 75 and 136% respectively from 1965–66 to 1968–69. Similar initiatives were rolled out in Haryana and western UP. With a lag of one year, wheat yield and production in the country increased by 36 and 76%, respectively from 1966–67 to 1969–70. The FCI procured 68 lakh metric tonne (lmt) wheat in 1968. An elated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi commemorated “Wheat Revolution” by releasing a postage stamp in 1968.
In the era of subsistence farming with bullock-drawn ploughs, cultivation of poor chapati-making red-coloured Mexican wheats was a disruptive technology, requiring shallow seeding, more irrigations and fertilizers, and threshing machinery. Agriculture scientists quickly developed high yielding amber-coloured dwarf wheats, modern production practices, and new machinery for sowing, harvesting, and threshing. Public policy promoted tube wells. Unlike unreliable canal water, tube well irrigation at the command of the farmer gave him the confidence to use costly seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs. Easy availability of institutional finance, by replacing limited Taccavi loans with expanded cooperative credit, promoted the use of off-farm inputs.
With introduction of semi-dwarf rice IR-8 from International Rice Research Institute, similar but slightly less spectacular success was achieved in rice. This was followed by remarkable increase in milk production under Operation Flood.
Ship-to-mouth importer became exporter
Fledgling independent India faced difficulties in importing food due to lack of credible currency and trade history. In early 1950s, USSR rescued India by accepting payment in Indian Rupees (INR). From 1956 onwards, US supplied wheat under Food for Peace Programme (PL-480) at cheap rates in INR payment.
The US Department of Agriculture recruited Second World War army logistics veterans for shipping wheat on a war footing. As ports were unable to handle huge quantity, a floating harbour was created by leasing a large super tanker from an oil company and anchoring it in the Bay of Bengal. Trains delivered US Midwest wheat to ships in US ports. More than 600 ships left for India in 1966 alone, emptying wheat into the floating harbour. Imported wheat was rushed from ships to feed the hungry, hence the term ‘ship-to-mouth existence’ of India.
After importing 1,050 lmt cereals (including 940 lmt wheat) from 1950 to 1977, India ceased to be a food importer, proving Paddock brothers wrong. Mismanagement of adequate national food stocks has necessitated occasional imports since then. Free of hunger and food shortage, India was able to devote more attention to important issues in national development.
Food secure India, however, has not been able to mitigate malnutrition and public health issues. Every year 10 lakh children below the age of five years die. As per National Family Health Survey-5 (2019–21), 35% children from this cohort are stunted, and will not achieve their earning potential. Fifty-seven per cent women in the reproductive age group (15–49 years) are anaemic, jeopardising health of their children.
In 2021–22, India exported 210 lmt rice (41% of global trade) and 78 lmt wheat at prices below the MSP and handling charges. It was possible due to leakage of free grains supplied under Prime Minister Garib Kalyan Anna Yojna and below MSP procurement in some states. Large rice exports by India lowered international price by 23% (year on year basis) in March 2022 whereas wheat price soared by 44%. Ban on wheat export by India on May 13 spiked global price by 5%. With large chunk of aid funds channelled to war-torn Ukraine, aid agencies and food-deficit countries are watching with bated breath the consequences of India’s export ban on broken rice and 20% export duty on about half of milled rice.
Is agriculture technology system losing agility?
With overflowing national food stocks, India became complacent. The technology (research and extension) system sems to be losing agility and responsiveness. Last wheat crop (Rabi 2021–22) is the classic example. Green Revolution started with wheat in Punjab. The national trend setter from 1960s to 1980s has become a laggard. Till first week of April 2022, Punjab was claiming to procure a record 135 lmt wheat against actual procurement of about 100 lmt. None from Department of Agriculture, Punjab Mandi Board and Punjab Agricultural University has been held accountable for the highly exaggerated claims. Except for blaming singing of the wheat crop by scorching March temperatures, a critical and quantitative analysis of yield reduction has not been undertaken.
Unlike previous episodes of high March temperatures, why did the straw (Toori) yield decline drastically in 2022? Why the productivity decline was more pronounced in Patiala, Fatehgarh Sahib and other districts with heavy soils? What percentage of wheat sowing was not completed by the optimum time of mid-November? What was the impact of shortage of DAP in the beginning of planting season? While Government functionaries and some scientists sitting in their offices were predicting record wheat production, avid farmers and some retired agriculture technology hands were flagging poor wheat crop by end February 2022. Is Punjab not repeating similar error of judgement with the current rice crop?
Overlooking that robust and independently verifiable data is the bedrock for sound policy formulation, similar wheat story appears to be repeated at the national level. Till mid-April 2022, record production of 1,100 lmt was predicted, although more than 90% of the crop was harvested. The revised estimate of 1,060 lmt production appears ambitious. The United States Department of Agriculture estimate of 960–980 lmt production, however, appears more realistic.
